In November 2022, Publix sued more than a dozen of its insurers in federal court in Tampa, claiming they had not honored policies that would protect it from opioid litigation claims.
It also countersued Cobb County in 2023, saying the Georgia community’s lawsuit was “motivated by promises of a windfall.” The case is still pending.
“Publix takes great pride in its relationship with its valued customers and the communities it serves,” that lawsuit states. “These novel and unprecedented claims are baseless, false, and belied by Publix’s decades of service.”
DEA officials declined to comment on Publix’s opioid record. No enforcement actions against Publix are listed in the federal registry.
A Growing Player
Since its 1930 start as a food store in Winter Haven, Florida, Publix has grown into a massive company with more than 250,000 employees and nearly 900 stores in Florida alone. Revered for its free cookies for kids, chicken tender subs, fresh produce, birthday cakes, and BOGO deals, the grocery chain has become one-stop shopping for customers.
And, increasingly, “Where Shopping Is a Pleasure” — Publix’s slogan since 1954 — includes powerful prescription drugs.
Publix was a smaller player in Florida’s opioid market before 2011, responsible for fewer than 5% of all opioid medications distributed to pharmacies across the state, according to the Times analysis of federal opioid data.
That year marked a turning point for opioid sales in Florida. As the scale of the opioid epidemic came to public attention, and litigation followed, most chain pharmacies began to back off their orders for pills, the data shows.
Many companies ultimately agreed to pay billions of dollars to settle lawsuits filed across the country by state and local governments. That included a $683 million settlement between Florida and Walgreens in May stating the pharmacy, which denied any wrongdoing, must pay for community treatment, education, and prevention programs, plus litigation costs.
In addition to hefty payouts, some settlement agreements required companies to adopt stricter controls to bring operations into fuller compliance with the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law that governs the manufacture, distribution, and use of drugs considered to have a high risk of being abused.
Distributors were required to adopt automated software that would flag suspicious orders from pharmacies such as quantities well above a store’s average. Pharmacy companies were required to conduct checks on doctors to ensure the prescribers are registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Those measures and others put the brakes on opioid distribution nationwide. Meanwhile, the distribution in Florida’s Publix stores went in the opposite direction: From 2011 to 2019, the grocery chain increased its dispensing of all opioid medication by 35%, according to the Times’ analysis of the data.
That growth far exceeded any increase in sales that would correspond to the grocer’s net addition of 146 pharmacies from 2011 to 2019.
As Publix’s distribution increased, so too did the number of orders that should have been flagged as suspicious, according to plaintiffs in multiple lawsuits. Drug distributor McKesson instructed its employees to investigate any pharmacy ordering more than 8,000 oxycodone pills in a single month as part of the company’s “Lifestyle Drug Monitoring Program,” according to 2018 congressional testimony.
Publix pharmacies’ orders surpassed that threshold almost 1,500 times in 2019, the Times analysis found, more than triple the number in 2011. The benchmark has been repeatedly used in opioid litigation as evidence of inadequate monitoring of drug distribution.
‘Red Flags’ Missed
As Tomkiewicz faced pressure from Teva management to fulfill Publix’s orders, he mined the data to back up his concerns, court records show. During a heated phone call, one Teva executive stressed that Publix was an increasingly important player in the opioid distribution market, Tomkiewicz said at his deposition, and an important client for the world’s largest generic drug manufacturer.
Tomkiewicz requested data from Publix’s 10 largest pharmacies by opioid sales, all located in Florida.
By law, Publix was required to keep tabs on the physicians whose prescriptions it filled. But it took Tomkiewicz just one day of searching the internet to find problems, according to time stamps on emails submitted in the court records.
Among the top prescribers at two Publix locations in Melbourne was Thomas Velleff, according to Tomkiewicz’s email. Public records and a newspaper report showed “significant anecdotal evidence of pill mill activity,” Tomkiewicz wrote. He said he found a 2010 article in the Treasure Coast Palm, in which a city employee claimed Velleff’s prior pain clinic in Palm City attracted “carloads” of patients, often with out-of-state license plates.
Complaints filed with the state Department of Health dating to 2010 allege that Velleff overprescribed opioids and failed to monitor his patients’ usage for signs of abuse. One 2017 complaint alleges that Velleff pressured one patient into loaning him money. The state Board of Medicine revoked Velleff’s medical license in December 2020. Velleff did not appear at his medical board hearing, according to the final order revoking his license. He did not respond to emails seeking comment.
A top prescriber at one Ocala store had been disciplined in 2011 for injecting herself with a sedative while leaving an anesthetized patient unsupervised. Other pharmacies repeatedly filled prescriptions from “cash-only” pain clinics or written by physicians located hundreds of miles away with no license to practice in Florida, Tomkiewicz wrote in the email. It is legal to do so, but drug diversion experts consider out-of-state prescriptions a red flag that should prompt additional checks for possible drug abuse.
Tomkiewicz had amassed a list of nine doctors among Publix’s top prescribers who made him wonder: “Why the hell do they still have a license and are still registered with the DEA?” according to his deposition.
Tomkiewicz also said in his deposition he was troubled by not just the volume of opioids Publix was selling, but that they were handing out a disproportionate share of 30-milligram instant-release oxycodone pills — another red flag for abuse. In an email to Teva’s director of compliance, he compared that with the Moffitt Cancer Center in Tampa, where cancer patients were mostly being prescribed 5 mg instant-release pills, court records show.
As the strongest dose on the market, the 30 mg pills have limited use in retail pharmacies and are highly sought-after among abusers, Tomkiewicz wrote in the email. Stronger doses of oxycodone are available, but only in long-release capsules such as OxyContin, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
Publix sold 4.8 million of the highly addictive high-dose pills in 2019 — roughly 1 in 10 of all oxycodone pills dispensed by the pharmacy chain that year, according to the Times analysis of the federal data.
Eventually, Tomkiewicz relented, he said in his deposition. As long as Publix promised not to send Teva products to nine locations that he’d picked out, he would let the shipment go ahead. Teva did not notify federal authorities, according to his deposition.
A Times review of court documents found no written record indicating that Publix responded to Tomkiewicz’s concerns at the time. An expert report submitted in the lawsuit came to the same conclusion.
This article was produced by the Tampa Bay Times and KFF Health News, a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues.